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I. Introduction 
Imagine that you have come down with a cold.  You immediately head 
to the nearest drug store in search of medicine to relieve your symptoms.  
You walk up and down the aisle and you notice that there are multiple 
variations of the drug that you need — Tylenol next to acetaminophen, 
Robitussin next to guaifenesin, etc.  You compare the two equivalent drugs 
and you note that most, if not all, of the ingredients are the same.  The only 
difference, aside from the name and packaging, seems to be the price at 
which these drugs are sold.  Did you ever consider what the effects would 
be if competitive non-brand-name drugs did not enter the market at all? 
A “generic drug” is defined as a term referring to any drug product 
that is marketed under its chemical name that is comparable to a brand-
name drug product in dosage form, strength, quality and performance 
characteristics, and intended use.1  Generic drugs are sold at a price 
substantially discounted from their respective brand-name drug, even 
though they are chemically identical.2  Creating a new drug is expensive 
because extensive research and development are required along with 
clinical trials.  Because generic drug makers do not need to develop a drug 
from scratch, the costs to bring drugs to the market are significantly less 
than drugs recently created through research and development.3  
Consequently, generic drugs are significantly cheaper than brand-name 
drugs.  Thus, generic drugs save consumers an estimated eight to ten billion 
dollars a year at retail pharmacies, and even billions more when used by 
hospitals.4 
Like most new products and inventions, new drugs are developed 
under patent protection.  Generally speaking, a patent application filed on 
or after June 8, 1995 has a term that begins on the date the patent issues and 
ends twenty years from its filing date.5  The patent serves to protect the 
investment made in the development of the new drugs by granting the 
company, who conducted the research, the exclusive right to sell the drug 
 
 1.  Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015). 
 2.  Generic Drugs, supra note 1. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  A CBO Study: How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices 
and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, at 14, (July 1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/pharm.pdf. 
 5.  U.S. Patent Act 35 U.S.C. §154(2). 
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while the patent is in effect.6  Generic drugs, however, have been allowed 
an exception through the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 — more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.  Drug companies can submit an abbreviated new drug application 
(“ANDA”) for approval to market a generic product.7  An ANDA must 
contain data, which when submitted to the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(“FDA”) Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Office of Generic 
Drugs, provides for the review and approval of a generic drug product.8  
Once approved, an applicant may manufacture and market the generic drug 
product to provide a safe, effective, and low-cost alternative to the 
American public.9  This ANDA process does not require the generic drug 
company to repeat costly clinical research related to ingredients or dosage 
forms that have already been approved for safety and effectiveness for the 
brand-name drugs.10  The first company to file an ANDA for a particular 
drug gets exclusive rights to market the drug as the generic alternative to 
the brand named drug for 180-days.11  After this six months period, other 
companies may sell generics and enter the marketspace. 
In response to the Hatch-Waxman Act, brand-name companies and 
generic drug companies now settle lawsuits in order to maximize their own 
profits.  Any two competitors can profit by agreeing not to compete with 
each other, as long as they can find a way to split the profits.12  The longer 
the competition is delayed, the more profits will be accumulated.  In 2013, 
the Supreme Court dealt with this issue in the case FTC v. Actavis, and 
deemed that these types of patent settlements could potentially face 
antitrust scrutiny.13  The Supreme Court considered the legality of patent 
litigation settlements that affect competition between branded and generic 
competitors.  These policies and precedents, alongside antitrust competition 
policy, underscore the importance of drug market competition in U.S. 
 
 6.  Generic Drugs, supra note 1. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDeve 
lopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics (last 
visited July 14, 2015). 
 9.  ANDA, supra note 8. 
 10.  Generic Drugs, supra note 1. 
 11.  21 U.S.C. § 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
 12.  Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Actavis and Error 
Costs: A Reply to Critics, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, at 1 (Oct. 2014). 
 13.  See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013). 
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healthcare policy.14  Accordingly, in my Note, I will discuss the effect of 
generic brands in the market, how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects anti-
competition within the pharmaceutical sphere, how the Supreme Court 
approaches this issue, and how lower courts have responded to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling regarding these settlements. 
II. The Effects of Generic Drugs in the Marketplace 
The Hatch-Waxman Act, which brought about the abbreviated 
pathway for generic drug approval, spurred the growth of the current 
generic drug industry in the United States.15  To gain FDA approval, a 
generic drug must contain the same active ingredients as the innovator 
drug; be identical in strength, dosage form, and route of administration; 
have the same use indications; be bioequivalent, meet the same batch 
requirements for identity, strength, purity, and quality; and be 
manufactured under the same strict standards of FDA’s good 
manufacturing practice regulations required for innovator products.16  The 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association noted that the generic drug industry 
has saved the American public $1.2 trillion over the past thirty years since 
the launch of the Hatch-Waxman Act.17  The increased trend in new drug 
approvals is a positive sign of the level of innovation demonstrated by the 
industry.18 
The use of generics has increased substantially since the mid-1990s, in 
part because of increases in the mechanisms available to promote generic 
use, including incentives in commercial insurance plans and public 
coverage, such as tiered formularies with lower patient co-payments for 
 
 14.   Luke M. Olson & Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic Drug Competition on Generic Drug 
Prices During the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day Exclusivity Period, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 1 (Apr. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/reports/estimating-effect-entry-
generic-drug-prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/ wp317.pdf. 
 15.  Mike Chace-Ortiz, Trends and Development in the U.S. Generics Drug Industry 2014, LIFE 
SCIENCES CONNECT (June 26, 2014), http://lsconnect.thomsonreuters.com/trends-developments-u-s-generics-
drug-industry-2014/. 
 16.  Generic Drugs, supra note 1. 
 17.  Generic Drug Savings in the U.S., GENERIC PHARM. ASSOC. 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/2013_Savings_Study_12.19.2013_FINAL.pdf. 
 18.  Jody Fisher, U.S. Drug Market Trends: Looking Beyond the LOE to the New Normal, 
PM360ONLINE (June 1, 2013), http://www.pm360online.com/u-s-drug-market-trends-looking-beyond-the-
loe-to-the-new-normal/. 
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generic than for brand-name drugs, and restricting formulary coverage to 
generics in certain therapeutic categories.19 
Since 1993, sales of drugs have increased from about $50 billion per 
year to around $300 billion in 2012.20  Many policymakers view generic 
drug competition as the principal method to contain the rapid growth in 
drug costs, which currently represents the fastest growing segment of 
healthcare expenditures in the United States.21 
Total healthcare system spending on medicine reached $320 billion in 
2011.22  Over 80% of a brand’s prescription volume is replaced by generics 
within six months of a patent expiring.23  As a result, generic products have 
increased its share of total dispersed prescriptions in the US from 36% in 
1994 to 84% in 2012.24  Generics also bring savings directly to patients.  In 
2010, the average copayment for a generic drug was $6.06 per prescription, 
compared to $34.77 for brand named drugs.25  During that year, generic use 
generated more than $157 billion in savings.26  Savings from generic 
medications have continued to grow at an exponential rate, reaching more 
than $360 billion from 2001 by the end of 2010.27 
The number of generic companies manufacturing a specific drug 
further affects the market.  New brand-name drugs generate nearly all of 
their sales during a market exclusivity period (“MEP”), which is the time 
period between market launch of a brand-name drug and the launch of its 
first generic.28  On average, the first generic competitor prices its product 
only slightly lower than the price of the brand-name manufacturer.29  The 
 
 19.  Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Brief Report: Recent Trends in 
Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, J. MED. ECON. 2, available at http://fds.duke.edu/ 
db/attachment/2575. 
 20.  Fisher, supra note 18, at 1. 
 21.  Olson & Wendling, supra note 14, at 1. 
 22.  The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2011, IMS INST. FOR 
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS 2 (2012), available at https://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/ 
Insights/IMS%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/IHII_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.pdf. 
 23.  The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2010, IMS INST. FOR 
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS 3 (2011), available at http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ 
imshealth/Global/Content/IMS%20Institute/Static%20File/IHII_UseOfMed_report.pdf. 
 24.  Grabowski et al., supra note 19, at 2. 
 25.  IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 23, at 14. 
 26.  SAVINGS: An Economic Analysis of Generic Drug Usage in the U.S., GENERIC PHARM. ASSOC. 3 
(2011), available at https://www.tevagenerics.com/assets/base/pdf/Savings,An EconomicAnalysis.pdf. 
 27.  Savings, supra note 26. 
 28.  Grabowski et al., supra note 19. 
 29.  Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm
129385.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2010). 
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entrance of a second generic manufacturer reduces the average generic 
price to nearly half the brand name price.30  Any additional generic 
companies manufacturing the brand-name drug affect the market less 
drastically.31  For products that attract a large number of generic 
manufacturers, the average generic price falls to 20% of the branded 
price.32 
III. Patent Settlements 
A. Reverse Payment Settlements 
A trend that has been rising in response to the increasing number of 
generics entering the pharmaceutical market are patent settlements that 
allow brand-name drugs to hold onto their control of the market.  These 
types of arrangement raise concerns associated with anticompetitive 
behavior by brand-name companies preventing other players in the market 
from entering.33  Over the past ten years, patent settlements have enabled 
dozens of first-time generics to come to market many months before 
patents on the counterpart brand-name drugs expired.34  In 2011, of the 
twenty-two new generic drug launches, settlements allowed sixteen of 
these generics to launch prior to patent expiry.35 
One particular type of settlement is a reverse payment settlement 
agreement, also known as “pay-for-delay” deals, which involve a brand-
name drug manufacturer compensating a generic brand entrant to abandon 
its patent challenge and not to enter the market for a number of years.36  
This settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather 
than the other way around, which is what is usually expected.37  The 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) estimated that these deals cost 
American consumers $3.5 billion a year.38  These generic firms are now 
agreeing to delay their launches not just for cash, but for a promise from 
the patent-holder to delay or cancel the launch of its authorized generic.39 
 
 30.  Generic Competition, supra note 29. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Robin Feldman. Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of Reason: The 
Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both. 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 66 (2014). 
 34.  IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 25, at 6. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Something Rotten, ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/ 14172627. 
 37.  FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  The Economist, supra note 36. 
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The four most common scenarios involving a brand-name company’s 
consideration to a generic brand are: cash, poison pill clauses, no-
authorized generic provisions, and forgiveness of damages.40  Cash is a 
form of consideration in which a brand-name drug manufacturer pays cash 
to a generic to delay entering the market.41  In this situation, the generic 
receives a type of consideration that would not have been available as a 
result of litigation — because under no circumstance would the brand-
name company supplement the generic’s entry into the market by paying it 
money.42 
A second type of compensation is a poison pill clause which ensures 
that a generic drug company can expedite its entry when another generic 
enters the market.43  These clauses ensure that no other generic 
manufacturer, no matter how much time and resources it spends in its 
litigation, can enter the market before the generic that has a poison pill 
agreement with the brand-named company. 
Another specific type of pay-for-delay agreement is a no-authorized 
generic (“No-AG”) arrangement.  When a generic enters the market to 
compete with the brand, typically the brand-name drug producer can 
introduce its own authorized generic version of the drug, making three 
drugs available for consumers (one brand and two generics).44  The entry of 
an authorized generic would make that 180-day window for the 
unauthorized generic brand much less profitable.  In a No-AG pay-for-
delay arrangement, the generic manufacturer is being compensated for 
agreeing to delay entry by the brand manufacturer’s own commitment to 
delay entry with its authorized generic. 45  In effect, this allows the generic 
manufacturer to keep their generic prices higher than they would be 
otherwise. 
The fourth scenario, brand forgiveness of damages, involves a 
situation in which a generic has already entered the market.  Even though 
generics sell their products cheaper than brand-name drugs, a generic found 
to be infringing on a brand-name drug’s patent could be liable for the 
higher level of damages in the amount of the brand-name drug’s lost 
 
 40.  See Michael A. Carrier. Payment After Actavis. 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 36-47. 
 41.  Carrier, supra note 40, at 36. 
 42.  Id. at 36–37. 
 43.  Id. at 37. 
 44.  Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Antitrust Master 
Course VII (Oct. 10, 2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_ 
statements/591131/141010actavisspeech.pdf. 
 45.  Id. 
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profits.46  In addition to lost profits, generics could also be liable for any 
reduction in brand prices resulting from the introduction of the generic 
drug.47  With this type of settlement, the brand-name drug company could 
settle by agreeing to forgive some of these damages.48 
When a party with no claim for damages walks away with money or 
other forms of compensation, simply so that it will stay away from the 
patentee’s market, antitrust issues come into question for these unjustified 
settlements.49 
B. Patent Exceptionalism Conflicts with Antitrust Goals 
The clash between patent law and antitrust law is a colossal one, with 
antitrust law abhorring monopoly and patent law advocating it.50  Patent 
exceptionalism is a misconstrued idea of the patent system to exercise free 
reign to patent holders.51  Patent exceptionalism follows the line of 
reasoning that when a patent is at play, antitrust should yield, and the 
government should keep its nose out.52  This reasoning derives that given a 
patent holder’s lawful right to exclude others from the market, a patent 
conveys the right to cripple competition.53  Patent exceptionalism flows 
from a distorted view of a patent’s actual function.54  As long as an 
invention is useful, new, and obvious a patent can be obtained.  A patent 
does not grant the right to do anything at all; except to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention that is patented.55  The mere fact 
that you have a patent is not an act of infringement.  Multiple patents may 
have overlapping rights to exclude,56 since a patent cannot infringe upon 
another patent. Antitrust law, on the other hand, characterizes exclusion as 
the prevention of an incursion of a rival in a competitive sphere.57 
 
 46.  Carrier, supra note 40, at 44. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 45. 
 49.  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004) (“[C]ollusion is “the supreme evil of antitrust.”). 
 50.  Feldman, supra note 33, at 66–67. 
 51.  See Id. at 62. 
 52.  Id. at 66. 
 53.  Id.; FTC. v. Watson Pharm.s, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1330 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 54.  Id. at 68. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
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C. Antitrust Scrutiny of Patent Settlements 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to combat 
anticompetitive practices, to reduce market domination by individual 
corporations, and to preserve unfettered competition as the rule of trade.58  
Violations under the Sherman Act take one of two forms — a “per se 
violation” or a violation of the “rule of reason.”59  A per se violation is 
delineated in Section 1 of the Sherman Act as certain business practices, 
and requires no further inquiry into the practice’s actual effect on the 
market or the intentions of those individuals who engaged in the practice.60  
A “rule of reason” analysis applies a totality of the circumstances test and 
inquires as to whether the challenged practice promotes or suppresses 
market competition.61  Intent and motive are often relevant in predicting 
future consequences during a rule of reason analysis.62 
The “rule of reason” doctrine is used to interpret the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  In a traditional rule of reason analysis: 
 
[The] court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its conditions before and 
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the Reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is 
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help 
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.63 
 
This inquiry seems three-pronged: (1) What harm to competition 
results or may result from the collaborators’ activities? (2) What is the 
object they are trying to achieve and is it a legitimate and significant one? 
And (3) are there less restrictive alternatives to the challenged restraint?64 
When applied to patents, the Sherman Act “imposes strict limitations 
on the concerted activities in which a patent owner may lawfully engage 
 
 58.  Legal Information Institute, Antitrust: An Overview, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW 
SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2015). 
 61.  Legal Information Institute, supra note 58. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 64.   Phillip Areeda, The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues, HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/antitrust.pdf 
$file /antitrust.pdf. 
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in.”65  In United States v. Singer Mfg. the Supreme Court held that the 
agreements, although settling patent disputes, violated antitrust laws.66  
That was because “the public interest in granting patent monopolies” exists 
only to the extent that “the public is given a novel and useful invention” in 
“consideration for its grant.”67 
IV. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Numerous laws, regulations and legal precedents play an important 
role in directly affecting drug competition by altering the structure and 
shaping the competitive environment of these markets.68  One piece of 
legislation in particular, The Hatch-Waxman Act, has been instrumental in 
constructing the market for both generic and branded drugs.69  The Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act to create an abbreviated pathway for approval of new drugs that are 
therapeutically equivalent to a brand drug.  This process prescribes 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to file an ANDA for approval of a generic 
drug by the FDA.70  Congress’ objective when enacting the legislation was 
to increase generic competition while balancing the resulting cost savings 
with sufficient incentives to encourage continued medical innovation 
through the development of new drugs.71 
In addition to the patents that protect new inventions, the Hatch-
Waxman Act grants periods of exclusivity to manufacturers that have new 
drugs approved by FDA.72  Generic manufacturers frequently challenge 
patents protecting these brand-name drugs. 73 
 
Apparently most if not all reverse payment settlement agreements 
arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation, and 
specifically in the context of suits brought under statutory provisions 
 
 65.  United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963). 
 66.  Id. at 195–97. 
 67.  Id. at 199 (White, J., concurring). 
 68.  Olson & Wendling, supra note 14. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2015). 
 71.  Grabowski, supra note 19, at 1. 
 72.  ASPE Issue Brief: Expanding the Use of Generic Drugs, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND DATA POLICE – U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 3 (2010). 
 73.  Grabowski, supra note 19, at 1. 
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allowing a generic drug manufacturer to challenge the validity of a 
patent owned by an already approved brand-name drug owner.74 
 
There are four key features of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The first of 
these features is that a drug manufacturer must submit a New Drug 
Application to the FDA if they wish to market a new prescription drug.75  
The manufacturer must submit as part of the application: full reports of 
investigations on the safety of the drug, a list of the articles used as 
components of the drug, a full statement of the composition of the drug, 
and more.76  Then, these new prescription drugs undergo a long, 
comprehensive, and costly testing process in order to receive marketing 
approval from the FDA.77  If a company only develops one drug, the 
median spending is still around $351 million.78  The median cost per new 
drug is $4.2 billion for companies that have launched more than three 
drugs; this value increases to $5.3 billion for those that have launched more 
than four drugs.79 
The second feature of the Hatch-Waxman Act as the previously 
mentioned is the abbreviated procedure for generic drugs, which grants 
permission of a generic drug manufacturer to obtain similar marketing 
approval.80  The generic drug manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New 
Drug Application specifying that the generic has the same active 
ingredients and is a bioequivalent to the already-approved brand-name 
drug.81  This allows the generic manufacturer to avoid the costs and time 
involved with the research of developing these drugs, which are required to 
obtain approval.  This in turn speeds the introduction of low-cost generic 
drugs to market thereby furthering drug competition. 
The third feature of the Hatch-Waxman Act addresses special 
procedures for identifying and resolving related patent disputes.  It requires 
the brand-name manufacturer to list in its New Drug Application the 
number and the expiration date of any relevant patent.82  The generic 
 
 74.  FTC. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible 
Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 24 (2004). 
 75.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1) (2015). 
 76.  Id. at § 355(b)(1)(A)–(G). 
 77.  Id. at § 355(b)(1). 
 78.  Matthew Herper, How Much Does Pharmaceutical Innovation Cost? A Look at 100 
Companies, FORBES, Aug. 11, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/the-
cost-of-inventing-a-new-drug-98-companies-ranked/. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1)–(2). 
 81.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(iv) (2013). 
 82.  See Id. at § 355(b)(1)(G). 
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manufacturer must then assure the FDA that the generic will not infringe 
the brand-name’s patents by: certifying that the brand-name manufacturer 
has not listed any relevant patents, certify that any relevant patents have 
expired, request approval to market beginning when any still-in-force 
patents expire, or certify that any listed relevant patent is invalid or will not 
be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug described in the 
Abbreviated New Drug Application.83  This last option is also known as the 
“Paragraph IV” route and automatically counts as patent infringement. 
The fourth feature is a special incentive for a generic to be the first to 
file an Abbreviated New Drug Application taking the Paragraph IV route.  
That applicant gets a period of 180-day exclusivity, where no other generic 
can compete with the brand-name drug.84  Of the provisions in the Hatch-
Waxman Act aimed at facilitating generic drugs entrance into the market, I 
will further discuss the ANDA process and Paragraph IV litigation. 
A. Abbreviated New Drug Application 
The ANDA process greatly reduces the cost of completing an FDA 
application for approval of a generic drug.85  To meet the FDA standards 
prior to the Hatch-Waxman amendments, generic manufacturers had to 
duplicate many of the brand-name manufacturer trials, and submit their 
own safety and efficacy data on their products.86  However, under the 
ANDA process, generic manufacturers only need to demonstrate that their 
products have the same active ingredients and are “bioequivalents” to their 
brand-name counterparts.87  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generics are 
also given an exemption to patent law rules, to begin research on the brand-
name’s drug prior to that brand-name drug company’s patent expiration.88 
B. Paragraph IV Litigation 
Another exemption to patent law that Hatch-Waxman allows generics 
is Paragraph IV litigation.  The Hatch-Waxman Act created incentives for 
generic manufacturers to challenge brand-name patents before they 
expire.89  During this process, the generic manufacturer notifies the FDA 
that either its generic product does not infringe on a listed patent on the 
 
 83.  See Id. at § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 84.  See Id. at § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 85.  Grabowski, supra note 19, at 2. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
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brand-name drug, or that the brand-name drug’s patent is not valid.90  A 
Paragraph IV challenge can be made at the dosage form or strength level.91  
The challenged brand-name drug company then has 45 days of receiving 
notice of a Paragraph IV litigation to file a patent infringement action 
against the generic company.92  The FDA cannot approve the generic 
company’s ANDA until the company prevails either in court, settlement, or 
expiration of a 30-month stay.93 
The incentive for a generic manufacturer to file a Paragraph IV 
challenge and to receive FDA final approval of its application is a 180-day 
period of exclusivity.94  The victor is then the only ANDA-approved 
generic version allowed on the market.95  The first-to-file status is 
determined by the day of filing.96  Multiple generic manufacturers can 
share first-to-file status if they file on the same day.97  As mentioned above 
in the previous section, the first generic manufacturer to enter the market 
generally drops their prices only slightly below the manufacturer’s price.  
Therefore, this 180-day window is potentially very profitable to a first-to-
file Paragraph IV challenger. 
The likelihood of a Paragraph IV challenge being filed has increased 
substantially in recent years, and has been occurring earlier in the drug life-
cycle.  Only 9% of drugs experiencing first generic entry in 1995 had 
experienced a Paragraph IV challenge prior to their first generic launch.98  
That number has increased to 81% by drugs experiencing first generic entry 
in 2012.99  Paragraph IV challenges also have been occurring in a shorter 
amount of time following the launch of a brand-name drug.  In 1995, the 
average time between the launch of the brand-name drug and the first 
Paragraph IV challenge was 18.7 years.100  In 2012, that span of time 
dropped to an average of 6.9 years.101 
There are a variety of factors that affect the initiation of a Paragraph 
IV challenge.  Paragraph IV challenge activity is even more aggressive for 
 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id.; See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(iii) (2013). 
 92.  Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 93.  Grabowski, supra note 19, at 2; See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2013). 
 94.  Grabowski, supra note 19, at 2. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 6 (Figure 3). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
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new drugs with sales greater than $250 million.102  Another factor that 
comes into play is the drug’s sales prior to generic entry, the nature of the 
patents protecting the drug, and the ease with which generic manufacturers 
can imitate the drug to satisfy FDA regulations.103  For example, for higher-
revenue drugs, generic manufacturers may be less selective when filing 
challenges, as even a low likelihood of success in litigation can yield a 
large expected return on the investment necessary to challenge a patent.104 
V. The Supreme Court’s Opinion on Reverse Payments 
The most recent Supreme Court decision regarding reverse payments 
is Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis.105  In this case, Respondent 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals obtained a patent for its brand-name drug 
AndroGel.106  The FDA approved the application and Solvay obtained a 
patent in 2003.107  The pharmaceutical companies Actavis, Inc. and 
Paddock Laboratories filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications for a 
generic drugs modeled after AndroGel for their own generic products.108  
Both companies certified under Paragraph IV that Solvay’s patent was 
invalid and that their generic drugs did not infringe it.109  Solvay initiated 
Paragraph IV litigation against Actavis and Paddock claiming patent 
infringement.110  The FDA approved of Actavis’ generic product, but 
instead of bringing its drug to market, Actavis and the other generic 
manufacturers entered into a “reverse payment” settlement agreement with 
Solvay.111  The specific terms of this agreement included Actavis agreeing 
not to bring its generic to market for a specified number of years 
(specifically sixty five months) before Solvay’s patent expired, and 
agreeing to promote AndroGel to doctors in exchange for millions of 
dollars”.112  The other generic companies made roughly similar promises.113  
 
 102.  Id. at 6. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Found by looking up “reverse payments” and filtering to Supreme Court cases in 
LexisNexis (last visited May 8, 2015). 
 106.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2224. 
 107.  Id. at 2229. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 2224–25. 
 110.  Id. at 2225. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 2229. 
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Solvay agreed to pay millions of dollars to each generic.114  The FTC 
stepped in and filed suit, alleging that the parties “violated §5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act by unlawfully agreeing to abandon their 
patent challenges, to refrain from launching their low-cost generic drugs, 
and to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits for nine years.”115  The 
companies described these reverse payments as compensation for other 
services the generics promised to perform, but the FTC contended that 
those services had little value.116  According to the FTC, the true point of 
the payments was to compensate the generics for agreeing not to compete 
against AndroGel until 2015.117  The basic question addressed here is 
whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish 
competition in violation of antitrust laws.118 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that as long as the anticompetitive 
effects of a settlement fall within the scope of the patent’s exclusionary 
potential, the settlement is immune from antitrust attack.119  The Supreme 
Court rejected this “scope of the patent” test used by the Eleventh Circuit. 
The Supreme Court ruled that reverse payment settlement agreements 
between branded and generic pharmaceutical companies are subject to 
antitrust scrutiny and should be analyzed under the traditional antitrust 
“rule of reason” analysis.120  The Supreme Court recognized that these 
reverse payment settlements tend to have significant adverse effects on 
competition.121  These agreements may lead to higher prices for 
pharmaceuticals by deterring generic entry, and contribute to increased 
health care costs that consumers, employers, and governments are 
struggling to contain.122 
A. FTC v. Actavis’ Antitrust Claim 
The Court in Actavis concluded that the FTC should have been given 
the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim for five reasons.123  First, the 
Court reasoned that the specific restraint at issue has the potential for 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 2230; App. 29, Complaint ¶5 (encompassing practices that violate the Sherman 
Act and the other antitrust laws). 
 116.  Id. at 2229. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 2227. 
 119.  FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 667 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012). 
 120.  Wright, supra note 44, at 2. 
 121.  Id. at 3. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. 
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genuine adverse effects on competition.124  The payment in effect amounts 
to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a 
right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to 
continue and the patent were held invalid.125  Permitting the patent 
challenger to enter the market before the patent expires would also bring 
about competition for the consumer’s benefit.126 
Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes 
prove unjustified.127  When a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement 
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for services, 
there is no same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to 
avoid the risk of patent invalidation.128  Traditionally, a party with a claim 
(or counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or less than the 
value of its claim.129  However, in the reverse payment settlement at issue, 
a party with no claim for damages (something that is usually true of a 
Paragraph IV litigation defendant) walks away with money simply to stay 
away from the patentee’s market.130 
Third, where a reverse payment threatens to encourage unjustified 
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that 
harm about in practice.131  This imbalance of power is reflected in the 
amount the pharmaceutical company is willing to pay off the generic brand.  
However, a strong and valid patent itself would help to assure such power 
in a way that would lessen the incentive of a company seeking to induce 
others to stay out of the market.132 
Fourth, an antitrust action is likely to prove more administratively 
feasible.  An unexplained large reverse payment suggests that the patentee 
has serious doubts about their patent’s survival.133  The objective of the 
payment would then be to maintain high levels of profits and share it with 
the patentee and the challenger, rather than face a potentially competitive 
market.134 
 
 124.  Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-461. 
 125.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 2235. 
 128.  Id. at 2236. 
 129.  Id. at 2233. 
 130.  Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(stating collusion is “the supreme evil of antitrust”). 
 131.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
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Lastly, the fact that a large unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust 
liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit.135  It 
is entirely possible to have settlements that do not include such unjustified 
reverse payments. 
B. The Actavis Court’s Conclusion 
The Court in Actavis concludes that a reverse payment, where “large 
and unjustified”, can bring the risk of significant anticompetitive effects.136  
A court should examine the size of the payment, and assess its likely 
anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications.137  The Court 
held that reverse payment settlements should be analyzed under the 
traditional “rule of reason” framework, and that the plaintiff’s prima facie 
demonstration of a settlement’s anticompetitive effects necessarily 
“depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future 
litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might 
represent payment, and the lack of other convincing justification.”138  This 
conclusion lends itself to the next issue namely: what constitutes a reverse 
payment that is worth litigation over a patent’s validity? 
The Court explained that when future courts analyze a payment that 
presents anticompetitive concerns, those courts should look to the 
payment’s “size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future 
litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might 
represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”139  
The Court has a strong preference for determining patent strength by 
examining the payment rather than the patent itself.140  An unexplained 
large reverse payment could suggest that the patent holder has serious 
doubts about the patent’s survival.141  Therefore, forms of payment from 
the brand-name drug to the generic drug company could constitute 
anticompetitive harm, in which even strong patents would not be protected 
from scrutiny. 
The Actavis Court however recognized two categories for which the 
settling parties could offer justifications.142  The settling parties should be 
allowed to show that the payment is either (1) no larger than litigation 
 
 135.  Id. at 2237. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 2237–38. 
 139.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 140.  Carrier, supra note 40, at 18. 
 141.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 142.  Carrier, supra note 40, at 19. 
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costs, or (2) that the payment is for unrelated generic services rather than 
delayed entry.143  Regarding litigation costs, if a defendant can justify 
payments that amount to no more than rough approximation of the 
litigation expenses saved through a settlement with redeeming virtues, then 
there is not the same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits 
to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.144 
The second justification involves brand payments for unrelated 
generic services.  These can include the brand-named drug paying for a 
generic company to market its product, to provide inventory or backup 
manufacturing services, to supply them with raw material or finished drug 
products, and/or for development agreements for unrelated products.145  If 
the brand really is paying for generic services in a transaction that does not 
involve the dividing of monopoly profits to pay for the delayed entry, it 
could offer a legitimate justification for its payment to the generic.146 
Aside from those two situations, Actavis leaves open for question of 
the type of compensation that constitutes an exclusion payment violating 
antitrust laws.  The Actavis Court directs lower courts to focus on the 
presence of significant unjustified anticompetitve consequences, and 
emphasized four elements to consider.147  These include: payments’ size, 
scale in relation to the payer’s anticipated future litigation costs, 
independence from other services for which it might represent payment, 
and lack of any other convincing justification.148  How the lower courts 
have interpreted Actavis will come up later in discussion. 
C. The Commissioner’s Response to the Actavis Holding 
Joshua Wright was sworn in as a Commissioner of the Federal Trade 
Commission on January 11, 2013, to a term that expires in September 
2019.149  Wright said there was no question the ruling covers all kinds of 
considerations.150  He states that, “Actavis clearly applies to reverse 
payment settlements involving noncash compensation.”151  To not involve 
 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 145.  Carrier, supra note 40, at 22. 
 146.  Carrier, supra note 40, at 21–22. 
 147.  Carrier, supra note 40, at 30. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Joshua D. Wright: Commissioner, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
about-ftc/biographies/joshua-d-wright. 
 150.  Melissa Lipman, No Question Actavis Goes Beyond Cash, FTC’s Wright Says, LAW 
360 (Oct. 10, 2014, 9:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/586388. 
 151.  Id. 
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such payments would create artificial limitations that simply do not make 
economic sense and would impose a rule that elevates form over 
substance.”152 
One standard the Supreme Court set for deals that might pose antitrust 
problems is comparing a payment to the costs the drug maker saves by 
avoiding further litigation as an appropriate benchmark.153  Wright however 
suggests that those litigation savings are not a good benchmark because 
even “very large payments,” much bigger than avoided litigation costs, can 
produce settlements that ultimately benefit consumers.154 
 
A litigation cost benchmark does not reliably identify anti-
competitive settlements and generates considerable risk of chilling 
consumer welfare-increasing settlements.  As lower courts continue 
to struggle with how to identify reverse payment settlements that 
likely reduce consumer welfare, it is important to accurately 
identify the relationship between payment size and harm before 
concluding payment size is indeed a ‘workable surrogate for a 
patent’s weakness,’ as the court suggested it may be.155 
 
Beyond advocating a “rule of reason” analysis, the Court did not set 
forth a clear structure for reviewing settlement agreements and left this job 
to the district courts.156 
The Commissioner notes that the post-Actavis landscape remains 
unsettled with respect to a number of critical questions concerning how 
lower courts will and should evaluate reverse payment settlements.157  
Particularly, he notes three questions: (1) does Actavis apply to noncash 
payments, (2) are reverse payments that are larger than avoided litigation 
costs considered to be “large and unjustified” within the Court’s 
framework, and (3) should courts balance competitive harms associated 
with delayed generic entry of a particular drug against any consumer 
welfare benefits to consumers of other drugs that would not occur but for 
the settlement.158 
 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Supra note 44, at 14. 
 156.  Jason Oliver, Supreme Court Holds Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements to be 
Analyzed Under “Rule of Reason” Approach, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1bf5b27a-6c24-4e24-9750-48d7ae135587. 
 157.  Supra note 44, at 2 
 158.  Id. 
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Regarding the first question of whether or not reverse payments must 
take the form of cash to be subject to antitrust scrutiny, Wright believes 
that Actavis clearly applies to reverse payment settlements involving 
noncash compensation.159  Even before Actavis, brand-name and generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers had entered into increasingly complex and 
creative settlement agreements that frequently included noncash 
consideration.160  Today’s settlement agreements include any number of 
nonmonetary elements in which a brand-name company agrees to not 
introduce an authorized generic that might compete with the generic firm’s 
product, such as complex supply agreements, marketing, and other 
advertising arrangements.161 
Regarding the second question, Wright contemplated the economic 
conditions under which inferences about competitive harm can reliably be 
drawn from a large payment and how exactly one interested in enforcing 
the antitrust laws or counseling clients would proceed to identify such 
payments.162  He finds that litigation costs are not an appropriate 
benchmark for evaluating reverse payments under the “rule of reason”.163  
He suggests that lower courts should be reluctant to rely on a truncated 
litigation cost benchmark substitute for a more full-blown “rule of reason” 
inquiry.164 
The next question is how to analyze large noncash payments under the 
rule of reason.  This is an inquiry that is difficult to define.  In the most 
common form of noncash payment from a brand manufacturer to a generic 
manufacturer to delay entry, a no-authorized generic agreement, the 
consumer welfare impact of such an arrangement is simple to analyze 
because the No-AG commitment offers no consumer benefits.  But this is 
not always the case, as pharmaceutical companies are settling their patent 
disputes in evermore complex fashions, often attempting to disguise the 
reverse payment.165  The rule of reason would require lower courts to 
analyze all the costs and benefits associated with the challenged conduct. 
 
 159.  Id. at 5. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Lipman, supra note 150. 
 162.  Id. at 9. 
 163.  Id. at 12. 
 164.  Id. at 15. 
 165.  FTC Files Amicus Brief explaining That “No-AG” Agreements Are Used by Drug 
Companies to Delay Generic Competition, FTC (Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-files-amicus-brief-explaining-no-ag-agreements-are-used-drug. 
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VI. Post-Actavis Landscape 
A. Circuit Courts 
The Third Circuit is the first Court of Appeals to take on a pay-for-
delay case since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on this matter.166  Experts 
say that the case will be significant as the first appellate ruling applying 
Actavis since the justices ruled in 2013.167  The Third Circuit will weigh in 
on the question of whether generic drug makers must receive cash for a 
deal to count as a reverse payment. 
The Appellate Court heard arguments over whether a New Jersey 
district court correctly concluded that the justices were only talking about 
cash settlements when they opened the door to antitrust challenges to 
Hatch-Waxman Act settlements.168  In King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc.,169 
the plaintiffs argued that the Third Circuit incorrectly dismissed their suit.  
They accused GlaxoSmithKline PLC of paying off Teva Pharmaceutical 
Industries Ltd. to delay launching a generic version of the drug Lamictal 
until the day before GSK’s patents were set to expire.  In exchange, 
plaintiffs argued that GSK promised not to launch its own authorized 
generic during Teva’s 180-day exclusivity window.170  The defendants say 
that a no-authorized-generic promise was simply a term of an exclusive 
early-entry license, which has always been allowed under patent law.171  
The defendants also make a case that a no-authorized generic provision is 
basically an exclusive license, and exclusive licenses are something that are 
expressly allowed under patent law.172  This issue comes down to what 
kind of payment the Supreme Court was referring to in Actavis. 
B. District Courts 
Of the seven courts to have considered this reverse settlement issue in 
light of Actavis, only two have ruled that Actavis requires cash payments.173  
The bulk of other district courts that looked at the issue of these types of 
 
 166.  Melissa Lipman, 3rd Circ. To Decide If Reverse Payments Must Be Cash, LAW 360 
(Nov. 17, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/591582/3rd-circ-to-decide-if-reverse-
payments-must-be-cash. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 170.  Lipman, supra note 166. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Lipman, supra note 150. 
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payments seem to agree that Actavis goes beyond straightforward cash 
payments.174  A broader issue that has come up is whether or not, for 
pleading purposes, the plaintiffs would have to specify a number for the 
payment value.175  Actavis merely says the payment must be “large and 
unjustified.”176  How should noncash payments have to be estimated in 
monetary terms in order to figure out if the payment counts as “large and 
unjustified”?177  Drug manufacturers will be arguing over whether 
settlements have to include cash payments to receive antitrust scrutiny 
under Actavis.178 
In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation held that the Actavis decision 
required cash consideration in order to trigger the “rule of reason” scrutiny 
fin determining whether a reverse settlement payment violates federal 
antitrust law.179  The court held that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged 
payment in the form of cash in exchange for agreement to stay out of the 
market for that drug, and the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim upon 
which relief could be granted.180  The motion to dismiss was therefore 
granted.181  The court stated the five factors in determining whether reverse 
settlement payments satisfy the rule of reason and how it could be 
measured when the reverse payment is made in cash.  However, noncash 
settlements were almost impossible to measure against these factors.182 
In a second case, the New Jersey District Court held that the buyers’ 
class action complaint challenging the patent settlement failed to state an 
antitrust claim, since there was no transfer of money in the settlement.183 
A majority of courts seem to take the opposite position that a reverse 
payment is not limited to cash payments.  The District Court of New 
Jersey, acknowledged that Actavis addressed cash payments, but concluded 
 
 174.  Lipman, supra note 166. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Lipman, supra note 150. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 195 (D.R.I. 2014). 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. at 191. 
 183.  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. CIV. 12-995 WHW, 2012 WL 
6725580, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012) adhered to on reconsideration, 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 566 
(D.N.J. 2014). 
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that the Supreme Court focused on the antitrust intent of the settling parties 
rather than the manner of payment.184 
The United States District Court in the Northern District of California 
stated that to constitute a “payment” under the “rule of reason” test, used in 
conjunction with evaluating terms of reverse payment in settlements 
involving patent infringement suits, the court must be able to calculate a 
value.185  The court found no need to restrict the definition of payment only 
to cash, since there are many plausible methods by which a court may 
calculate the value of nonmonetary terms.186 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also held that a reverse 
“payment” was not limited to cash.187  That court also concluded that a 
non-authorized generic provision did not have the same economic effect as 
a grant of exclusive license to enter market prior to expiration of a 
patent.188 
The District Court in Massachusetts also did not see it fit to read into 
the opinion a strict limitation of its principles to monetary-based 
arrangements alone.189  Adoption of a broader interpretation of the word 
“payment” would serve the purpose of aligning the law with modern-day 
realities.  Nowhere in Actavis did the Supreme Court explicitly require 
some sort of monetary transaction to take place for an agreement between a 
brand and a generic manufacturer to constitute a reverse payment.190 
The District Court of Connecticut also follows the same line of 
reasoning and does not think these payments should be limited to cash 
payments.191  Since large and unjustified reverse payments can bring with 
them the risk of significant anticompetitive effects regardless of the 
particular form of transfer, they should not be limited to cash payments.192 
 
 184.  In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *20 (D.N.J. Oct. 
6, 2014). 
 185.  United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. 
Supp. 3d 1052, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 186.  Id. at 1069–70. 
 187.  In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa 2014). 
 188.  Id. at 750. 
 189.  In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 
2013). 
 190.  Id. at 392. 
 191.  In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 3:14–md–2516, 2015 WL 1311352 at *11-12 (D. 
Conn. 2015). 
 192.  Id. at 12. 
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VII. Conclusion 
Pharmaceutical companies spend much of their time and resources in 
conducting research and clinical trials to develop new drugs.  Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drugs can refer to the same tests that the 
brand-name drugs have conducted, as long as the generic brands can 
prove similarities in the biological makeup of both drugs.  As a result, 
pharmaceutical companies have been paying off generic companies to not 
enter the market until their patents are nearly expired — a transaction 
known as a reverse payment.  These companies have been settling 
lawsuits in order to maximize their own profit, at the expense of the 
benefit to society.  This trend of reverse payment patent settlements that 
has developed in response to the Hatch-Waxman Act has promoted anti-
competition in the marketplace, and even rises to the level of antitrust 
scrutiny.  While proving to be beneficial to the pharmaceutical industry, 
reverse payments create an antitrust issue by allowing the pharmaceutical 
companies to monopolize the market space, as well as creating a public 
interest problem by taking away public access to cheaper drugs. 
Congress’ objective when enacting the Hatch-Waxman legislation 
was to increase generic competition while balancing the resulting cost 
savings with sufficient incentives to encourage continued medical 
innovation through the development of new drugs.  Like most of the 
district courts that have taken on this post-Actavis issue, I agree that 
reverse payments should not be confined to cash payments in order to rise 
to the level of antitrust scrutiny.  Given the complexity of modern day 
payment formulations, it would be detrimental for future reverse payment 
cases to pigeon-hole the parameters of payments to cash.  In determining 
the antitrust scrutiny level, it is important to consider whether the brand-
name drug has conveyed to the generic a type of consideration that is not 
a direct consequence of winning the lawsuit. 
Generic drugs play an important role in the pharmaceutical consumer 
landscape.  Many policymakers view generic drug competition as the 
principal method to contain the rapid growth in drug costs.  Therefore, 
restricting options for American consumers would go against the original 
intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
